Aydın Tiryaki (2026)
The advertising and sponsorship budgets of giant institutions operating with public resources possess a strategic power too significant to be left solely to the initiative of boards of directors. To distribute this power fairly, we propose a hybrid model based on data and citizen preference.
Millions of people who use a public bank’s credit card, fly with a national airline, or receive service from the state’s communication infrastructure frequently face a contradiction in their daily lives: “Why do I never see the advertisements of this institution—which I sustain with my taxes or payments—in the newspaper I read, on the TV channel I watch, or on the digital platform I follow?”
This question contains not just a commercial complaint, but a democratic demand. Public institutions are obliged to embrace the entire society. However, in current practice, the distribution of advertising budgets is often shaped by subjective decisions, political balances, or lobbying activities. This situation leads to unfair competition in the media sector and damages the sense of belonging in large segments of society who feel “excluded.”
The “Democratic Ad Governance” model we propose aims to eliminate this arbitrariness by handing the decision-making mechanism over to mathematics and direct citizen preference.
The Current Problem: The Alienation of the Financier
The budget of public companies comes, directly or indirectly, out of the public’s pocket. However, the citizen has no say in the communication strategy of the system they finance. When an institution effectively “ignores” the cultural and intellectual nourishment sources (newspapers, channels, clubs) of the citizen who makes it profitable every day, it is effectively ignoring the citizen as well.
More importantly, political and social pressures on public administrators can cause advertising budgets to flow to specific focal points while imposing an “embargo” on media outlets perceived as dissenting or different. This turns into an economic censorship mechanism that threatens the financial independence of the media.
The Proposed Solution: The 50/50 Hybrid Distribution Model
The solution to this problem lies in leaving the initiative not to the manager’s “courage,” but to the system’s “justice.” In our proposed model, the annual advertising budget of public institutions is divided into two main pools:
1. The Data-Driven Pool (50%): This segment is distributed entirely according to objective market data. Circulation, ratings, and click-through rates audited by independent organizations are taken as the basis. Whoever is watched or read the most receives their share of the pie with mathematical precision, regardless of their political stance. This is the “right of mass access.”
2. The Preference-Based Pool (50%): This is the revolutionary aspect of the model. This segment is distributed according to the declarations of the customers/citizens who actually use that institution.
Implementation Mechanism: Participation at the Moment of Transaction
The system must operate within the flow of daily life without creating extra bureaucracy for the citizen.
- Ticket and Invoice Integration: When a citizen buys a ticket from a public airline or logs into a public bank’s mobile branch, a simple selection screen appears: “Where would you like to see the advertising share of the revenue generated from our service?”
- Categorical or Name-Based Selection: The user can select the local newspaper they follow, the news channel they watch, or a thematic area they wish to support (e.g., Science-Technology, Culture-Arts).
- Sustainability (The 5-Year Rule): Instead of asking for every transaction, the preference made is considered “valid” in the system for a reasonable period (e.g., 3 or 5 years). During this period, every expenditure made by that person is recorded as a “support point” for their preferred media outlet. The individual has the right to update this preference whenever they wish.
Justice Not Only in Media, But Also in Sports
The same model applies to sports sponsorships, for which public institutions allocate massive budgets. In the current order, sponsorships are often determined by the lobbying power of club executives. However, in the proposed model, a bank customer or passenger should be able to say, “I support Team X” or “I want the National Volleyball Team to be supported.” Thus, public resources are distributed to teams not through backroom bargains, but through the proportional power of the fans (customers) who keep that institution standing.
Conclusion: Advertising as a “Shield of Democracy”
The realization of this model is not merely a change in marketing strategy; it is a giant step taken in the name of social peace and transparency.
- A Shield for Executives: Public administrators can protect themselves against “Give/Don’t give ads to this place” directives from political pressure groups by saying, “I cannot intervene; the system and our customers determine this.”
- Dignity for the Customer: The citizen trusts the institution more, knowing that “Where my money goes, my voice counts.”
- Freedom for the Media: Media outlets compete to get themselves read and watched by the public, rather than currying favor with power centers.
If public companies belong to “everyone,” their voice should be heard “everywhere.” This proposed model will transform advertising budgets from being “hush money” or a “political handout” into a functioning gear of participatory democracy.
A Note on Methods and Tools: All observations, ideas, and solution proposals in this study are the author’s own. AI was utilized as an information source for researching and compiling relevant topics strictly based on the author’s inquiries, requests, and directions; additionally, it provided writing assistance during the drafting process. (The research-based compilation and English writing process of this text were supported by AI as a specialized assistant.)
