Aydın Tiryaki (2026)

In our previous article, we demonstrated that sponsorships in football by direct public institutions should be collected in a central pool and distributed according to certain criteria. However, the “public influence” in the football economy is not limited to state institutions alone.

Local Governments (Municipalities) and Private Companies Receiving Public Tenders, which act as the back doors of the system, have become the main source of financing for unfair competition and “project teams.” In this article, we propose rules to regulate these two gray areas.

1. Local Governments and Regional Institutions: City Team or Preferred Team?

It is entirely natural and necessary for municipalities to support sports clubs for local development and city branding. However, a strict distinction must be made here between “Single-Team Cities/Regional Identification” and “Multi-Team Metropolises.”

A. Single-Team Cities and Regional Identification (Natural Support)

If a province or district has only one representative in the professional league, it is perfectly fair for that municipality to sponsor that team. Because that team is the common ground of that city.

By the same logic, support from public institutions identified with a specific city or region should be considered a “natural right.” Example: Although Çaykur is a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE), it is integrated with the city of Rize and tea agriculture. Therefore, Çaykur’s support and naming sponsorship for Çaykur Rizespor is not an ordinary advertising deal, but an investment in that city’s identity. Such public/municipal supports that are “flesh and bone” with the city are entirely normal and should be supported.

B. Multi-Team Metropolises (Equal Distance Rule)

The problem begins in cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, which have multiple teams in the same league. If a Metropolitan Municipality collects taxes from the entire public but transfers this resource to only one of the teams competing in the same league (usually the team with political or bureaucratic affinity), this constitutes unfair competition.

Rule: If Metropolitan Municipalities have more than one team in the same league, they must distribute their sponsorship budgets among these teams according to the “Hybrid Model” (Success + Number of Fans) criteria we defined earlier. They cannot give to one and ignore the other.

2. Companies Receiving Public Tenders: Not Paying a “Tribute,” But Pool Support

This is the biggest “black hole” in the football economy. Companies that appear as “private companies” on paper but derive a large portion of their turnover from public tenders (construction, energy, infrastructure, etc.) often provide massive sponsorships to project teams with no fanbase, usually upon “recommendations from above.”

Although these companies are technically private, the source of the money they spend is indirectly public. Therefore, they cannot transfer this money only to teams dictated to them in a way that wounds the public conscience.

Proposal: Pool Obligation in Proportion to Public Revenue

If a company wants to sponsor football, its revenue structure is examined:

1. Public Dependency Index: How much of the company’s annual turnover comes from public tenders? (e.g., 70%).
2. Pool Transfer Rule: If a company has a structure that grows through public tenders, it must deposit the portion of its football sponsorship budget corresponding to its public revenue (70% in our example) into the League’s “Centralized Public Advertising Pool” instead of giving it directly to the club.

Example Scenario: Construction Company X, which has received a massive highway tender from the public, wants to sponsor a “favored” team in the Super League with no spectators for 10 Million Dollars.

• The Rule Says: “80% of your revenue comes from the public. Therefore, you will deposit 8 Million Dollars of this 10 Million Dollars into the Central Pool, from which all teams in the league will benefit. You can give the remaining 2 Million Dollars to the team you want.”

Conclusion: Closing the Back Doors

With this regulation;

1. Companies enriching themselves through public tenders are prevented from transferring this wealth to specific project teams as if paying a “debt of gratitude” or tribute.
2. Municipalities are prevented from practicing political discrimination among teams in their cities.
3. As in the Çaykur Rizespor example, natural supports integrated with the city are protected, while artificial supports are blocked.

Football is a game played by 11 people on the field; but if you put the tender power of the state behind one team and only fans behind the other at the financing table, the name of that game is not justice. This integrated system we propose will make football the game of the people, not the “tender rich.”

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A Note on Methods and Tools: All observations, ideas, and solution proposals in this study are the author’s own. AI was utilized as an information source for researching and compiling relevant topics strictly based on the author’s inquiries, requests, and directions; additionally, it provided writing assistance during the drafting process. (The research-based compilation and English writing process of this text were supported by AI as a specialized assistant.)