Aydın Tiryaki (2026)

IMPORTANT NOTE AND SCOPE: The criticisms and the model proposed in this article cover exclusively the Professional Football industry. The vital support provided by public institutions (e.g., Vakıfbank, Ziraat Bank, Turkish Airlines) for the development of amateur branches such as volleyball, basketball, athletics, and the training of Olympic athletes is entirely outside the scope of this discussion. While investments by public institutions in amateur and women’s sports are a “social responsibility” and “public service,” the resources they transfer to professional football, which has created its own massive economy, are commercial transactions. Our proposal is aimed solely at remedying the injustice in this commercial and colossal football pie.

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Sports is not merely a means of entertainment; it is also a massive industry. One of the primary financial engines of this industry is sponsorship and advertising revenue. While the private sector is free to allocate its budget to any team in line with its commercial goals—a requirement of the free market—the situation changes when it involves public resources transferred to professional football or sponsorships by institutions managed by public authority (companies under the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund – TMSF, State-Owned Enterprises – SOEs, or semi-public partnerships).

Public funds belong to the public. Transferring public money to specific clubs based on non-transparent criteria in a football league where competition is essential creates “unfair competition” and wounds the public conscience.

Today in Turkish football, we face the reality of “project teams” that lack mass support (fanbase) but are sustained by massive public or semi-public sponsorships. The solution to this situation is not to deprive football of public resources entirely, but to manage them through a “Fair, Democratic, and Hybrid Distribution Model.”

Scope of the Problem: What are Public Resources?

In this model, we must define “public resources” broadly. This includes not only state banks or public subsidiaries but also structures where management is appointed by the public or where the public holds a share, as well as companies under the management of the TMSF.

If there is public will in the management of a company, the advertising budget allocated by that company to a football club must be distributed with the public interest and competitive equality in mind.

The Proposed Solution: Centralized Football Advertising Pool

In our proposed system, advertising budgets allocated to football clubs by public and related institutions should not be distributed through bilateral agreements directly with clubs. Instead, they should be collected in a “Centralized Public Advertising Pool” established on a league-wide basis.

The resources accumulated in this pool should be distributed to all teams in the league “in proportion to their power” and at an “equal distance” using a mathematical formula that leaves no room for arbitrariness. However, “equality” here does not mean giving everyone the same amount of money; it means applying the same rules to everyone.

The Hybrid Distribution Model: Merit and Democracy

For this sharing to be fair, a hybrid model similar to the current broadcasting revenue system, but one that significantly prioritizes “public support,” must be implemented.

The model is built on two main pillars:

1. The Merit Column (Sporting Success)

A league is a competition, and the winner must be rewarded. A portion of public resources (e.g., 40-50%) should be distributed based on the teams’ performance that season.

• Ranking in the league table.
• Number of wins and draws.
• Success in Cups and European competitions.

This column encourages competition and rewards the winner on the field.

2. The Democracy Column (Public Interest and Participation)

This is the major deficiency of the current system and the antidote to “project teams” in football. If public resources belong to the public, more resources should go to where the public shows the most favor. This is “consumer democracy.” This column (e.g., 50-60%) should be calculated based on the following criteria:

• Ticketed Attendance: How many people go to the stadium?
• Occupancy Rate: How much of the existing capacity is utilized?

This criterion prevents structures that lack fan power and play to empty stands—but are powerful at the lobbying table—from using public resources disproportionately. If 500 people attend one team’s match, it cannot be explained by mathematics or democracy for that team to receive the same or more public support than a team attended by 40,000 people.

Compensation for the Past: The Principle of Retrospective Offsetting

Justice involves not only today and tomorrow but also repairing past injustices. If a football club has used public resources disproportionately to its fan power and sporting success over the last 5 or 10 years, receiving far more than it deserved, this cannot be “ignored” in the new system.

Therefore, a “Confrontation with the Past and Offsetting” algorithm must be added to the system:

1. Retrospective Screening: Public/TMSF-sourced sponsorships received by football teams over the last 5-10 year period are examined.
2. Fair Share Calculation: The “Amount that should have actually been received” is calculated based on sporting success and estimated attendance averages for those years.
3. Collection of Difference (Offsetting): If a team has received more from public resources than it should have, this “overpayment” is collected from that team’s future pool revenues by spreading it over a certain schedule.
4. Compensation of the Victim: These deducted amounts are distributed as a “balance share” to other clubs that were not sufficiently benefited from public resources in the past despite deserving it.

With this method, the damage caused by clubs that gained an unfair competitive advantage through public resources is repaired over time, and the league’s financial balance is placed on a historical foundation of justice.

Implementation: Exchange for Services, Not Cash

Based on the points collected in the pool (and any offsetting deductions), the share each team receives is determined. Public institutions utilize mediums such as kit sponsorships and in-stadium areas starting with the teams with the highest points, in exchange for the value determined by the pool.

Thus;

1. Clubs that appeal to large masses and are successful transparently receive the share they deserve.
2. Anatolian clubs are guaranteed a “Base Income” from the pool in proportion to their presence in the league and the support of their cities.
3. Public institutions use their resources correctly by displaying their advertisements in football’s most-watched showcases.

Conclusion

Justice in football is not achieved solely by the referee’s whistle; it begins with the equalization of economic conditions. A race between teams backed by public power and teams standing solely on their own resources and fans is not fair.

The hybrid model we propose does not prevent the transfer of public resources to football; on the contrary, it ensures that this transfer sits on a transparent, measurable, and most importantly, democratic ground, free from suspicion. By keeping the pristine support of institutions like Vakıfbank in volleyball or THY in amateur branches separate, we must establish a system in a massive industry like football where the winner is not the powerful one, but the deserving one who stands with the people.

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A Note on Methods and Tools: All observations, ideas, and solution proposals in this study are the author’s own. AI was utilized as an information source for researching and compiling relevant topics strictly based on the author’s inquiries, requests, and directions; additionally, it provided writing assistance during the drafting process. (The research-based compilation and English writing process of this text were supported by AI as a specialized assistant.)